This article analyses the implications of the internationalisation of capital markets, and the influx of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors, for the French model of capitalism. Its central contention is that the global convergence thesis misrepresents contemporary evolutions because it pays insufficient attention to mechanisms of change within models of capitalism. Secondly, framing analysis in terms of hybridisation and fragmentation of national models, rather than convergence, offers greater explanatory purchase over the French model, constitutes a more accurate characterisation, and helps avoid the 'convergence or persistence' impasse within models of capitalism analysis. In exploring French corporate governance, it emphasises the importance of specifying the role of institutional mechanisms as transmission belts of change as a precursor to an assessment of how far shifts in international political economic context bring about changes within French capitalism. Focusing on financial market regulation regime, new legislation in corporate governance and company law, and the market for corporate control as three key potential mechanisms of change, it finds that pre-existing norms and structures endure, mediating the nature of a national political economy's articulation with the international
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French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy context. Hybridisation, and recombination of capitalist institutions drawn from different models, provide a far more persuasive account than convergence.
i The author would like to thank Michel Goyer, and three anonymous referees, for helpful and insightful comments on an earlier version of this article. 
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French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy
There is increasing recognition that the complexity of economic globalisation generates 'patterns of both economic convergence and divergence' not captured by 'neoclassical or linear models of economic globalisation which equate it solely with global economic convergence' (McGrew 2005: 220) . Anticipation that convergence will occur and is needed to 'prove' the existence of globalisation is flawed, rooted in a textbook neoclassical economic model, and the theoretically threadbare 'logic of no alternative' argument, both projected unhelpfully onto the global political economy. Rather, how the process of globalisation really 'plays out' is 'highly uneven such that it is associated with both economic convergence and divergence, as different economies/subregions/sectors are differentially integrated into this globalizing world economic order' (McGrew 2005: 221) . In this light, diversity of responses to globalisation, and the particularities of how it is mediated by 'domestic' institutions and politics, are all part of the 'variable geometry' (Castells 2000) of globalisation.
Such thinking prepares the ground for cross-fertilisation between IPE and comparative political economy analysis. Many comparative political economy scholars have become increasingly frustrated with the 'are we witnessing either convergence or persistence' framing of the debate about the evolution of models of capitalism. Thus, in this case, either the French political economy is preserved in aspic, or the French political economy is continually evolving in a process of convergence. Such a cul de sac struggles to account for the co-existence of dramatic changes (many along similar lines in different cases) and enduring highly significant particularities.
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A further problem with the convergence account is that use of ideal types leads to a stylised, caricatured version of the 'Anglo-Saxon' or liberal market economy (LME) model becoming the yardstick by which convergence is judged. Yet the US political economy, for example, often fails to conform to the ideal-type supposedly so closely modelled upon it (see Crouch 2005: 441-2) . Indeed, this is particularly true of corporate governance. Large US companies developed a range of anti-takeover devices ("shark repellents") in the wake of the 1980s takeover boom, notably through state law legislation and favourable state court decisions (Monks & Minow 2004: 42, 110-120, 232-239) . This created impediments to the market for corporate control, generating a disparity between US corporate governance and the LME ideal-type.
A number of ways out of the 'convergence or persistence' impasse have been suggested.
Hay, for example, frames his analysis in terms of 'common trajectories, variable paces, divergent outcomes' (Hay 2004) , whilst others have characterised evolutions in terms of 'hybridisation' (Perraton & Clift, 2004: 258; Lütz 2004: 189) . Hybridisation is helpful because it captures the qualitative nature of change, doing less violence to the facts than a rather too loosely and liberally applied notion of convergence.
Hybridisation itself, however, can be subject to different interpretations. Lütz's sophisticated recasting of the convergence thesis talks of 'convergence within national diversity ' (2004: 171) and 'cross-national patterns of convergence and diversity ' (2004: 184) . This nuanced conception of convergence recognises that 'cross national diversity also characterises the timing of regulatory efforts, and the extent of institutional change' 3 French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy (2004: 186) , and how 'weight shifting among actors ... takes place within institutional frameworks of regulation that are still diverse across countries ' (2004: 184) . Thus 'domestic responses to globalisation' involve a mixture of both 'convergence' and 'persistence ' (2004: 189) . Yet this raises the spectre of 'conceptual stretching'. If all these caveats are admitted, are we really still talking about convergence? Moreover, it is difficult to see how any evidence could be interpreted as contrary to this convergence thesis.
The elision within this 'hybridisation as convergence' argument is to interpret all change (even non-convergent change) as evidence of convergence. Logically, what is being converged towards in this account is something rather different from the standard 'AngloSaxon' LME ideal-type (Hall & Soskice 2001: 27-33) , and to this extent it represents a considerable improvement on the simple convergence thesis. Nevertheless, the very term convergence conveys the sense of a telos at work reducing ever further the difference across cases.
Crouch offers further potential to escape the 'persistence versus convergence' impasse.
Crouch criticises the varieties of capitalism approach for being 'fixed over time,' making 'no provision for changes in characteristics ' (2005: 444) . In analysing what he calls variously 'capitalist diversity', and 'the diversity of economic institutions', Crouch argues that 'empirical cases should be studied, not to determine which (singular) of a number of theoretical types they should each be allocated, but to determine which (plural) of these forms are to be found within them, in roughly what proportions, and with what 4 French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy change over time ' (2005: 440) . The resultant 'recombinant capitalism' approach to models of capitalism analysis involves 'deconstructing into constituent elements and then being ready to recombine into new shapes the aggregated forms ' (2005: 440) . Through this lens, a more differentiated political economy of capitalism can be analysed, accounting for change without reference to convergence.
This article adopts such an approach, and illustrates its relevance through a focus on specific mechanisms of change within French capitalism. These mechanisms of change do not receive the attention they deserve within much comparative institutional political economy analysis. Indeed, Campbell argues that 'institutionalists rely on causal concepts but often without specifying the underlying mechanisms or processes by which change occurs … vague concepts end up carrying much of the argument when, in fact, mechanisms should be doing the work ' (2004: 5) . The mediation of McGrew's 'financial deepening' of globalisation through these mechanisms of change explains why hybridisation, and 'recombination' of different capitalist forms are the most likely outcomes, rather than convergence, or 'dual convergence' on the liberal and co-ordinated varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001 ; for a critique see Hay 2004: 232-8) .
The focus here on French corporate governance identifies the key mechanisms of restructuring, and assesses the degree of change within French capitalism. Corporate governance involves a key 'nexus of institutions' (Cioffi 2000: 574) This analysis of the role of institutional mechanisms of change within French corporate governance suggests a rethinking of 'institutional complementarity', normally seen as the cement which ensures persistence of Varieties of Capitalism (Hall & Soskice 2001: 17-21) . Here, the focus on mechanisms of change illustrates how institutional complementarity is more helpfully deployed in explaining the differential effects of similar kinds of changes within capitalisms. The impact of a single institution in a given framework is mediated by the presence of other institutions, thus the same institution will produce different consequences across different institutional frameworks. Hybridisation and fragmentation of national models (Perraton & Clift 2004: 258) , and 'recombination' of different capitalist forms (Crouch 2005) provide far more persuasive 6 French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy narratives than the convergence of capitalisms thesis. The reason is rooted in the mechanisms of change, and how they shape the impacts of international changes on the internal dynamics of capitalism. The first section establishes the context of the recent restructuring of French capitalism, and key evolutions in French capital markets. The remainder of the article identifies the key potential mechanisms of change. Analysis focuses on the financial market regulation regime, specific government regulatory policies in the field of corporate governance and company law, and the market for corporate control. Finally, the conclusion draws out the implications of these findings for comparative and international political economy analysis.
The Restructuring of Financial Markets and Ownership within French Capitalism
To a degree, the restructuring of French capitalism in the 1980s and early 1990s was carried out behind barriers that protected large firms from the demands of portfolio investors. These included the role of the state as both owner and orchestrator of 'managed capitalism', cross-shareholding, and interlocking board directorships. For example, the privatisation process between 1986-1988 was managed by finance minister Balladur to deliberately reinforce France's protected 'financial network economy' (Schmidt 1996: 369-392) . Both Morin (1998; and Goyer (2003a & b) note significant shifts within the 'financial networks' that hitherto articulated the core of the French economic model, suggesting that those barriers are considerably more porous today. The reconstructing of noyaux durs (or 'hard cores' of interlocked investors) and creation of interlinking networks to articulate the French model of capitalism was, it seems, a transitional phase.
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French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy One marked feature of the restructuring process is the internationalisation of ownership and shareholding patterns in France. This departed from post-war norms, when foreign investment was discouraged, and even opposed by the French state (Michalet, 1997: 319-20) . From the mid-1990s, further privatisation became an important catalyst in the unravelling of the noyaux durs.
The noyaux durs, previously maintained by merger and acquisition (M & A) strategies that sustained cross-shareholding, began to unravel in the late 1990s. The extremely healthy profit margins of French business from the mid-1980s onwards tended to be creamed off as profit rather than re-invested within French firms (Lordon 2001). Despite such healthy profit margins, a 'conglomerate discount' penalised French firms for the (perceivedly less efficient) organisational form, leading Goyer to argue that these large French firms were substantially under-capitalised in the mid-1990s (2003b) . This opportunity to extract the surplus profits associated with a 'correction' in firms' market value meant that, just as large equity stakes in these firms were becoming available through privatisation, and the liberalisation of French capital markets, there were strong incentives to invest in these companies. The equity stake of hard-core shareholder groups fell significantly, and the equity holding of foreign investors, notably Anglo-Saxon institutional investors, grew substantially.
The expansion in foreign holdings on the French stock exchange is remarkable. Between 1985 and 1997, foreign owners increased their share of stock exchange capitalisation from 10 per cent to 35 per cent (compared to 9 per cent in Britain, and 6 per cent in the 8 French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy US) (Morin, 2000: 42) . By November 2000, of CAC 40 (top 40 French firms), the average foreign equity holding was over 40 per cent -a record among world's leading industrial nations (Maclean 2002: Table 7 .7).
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors' strategic priorities were defence of 'core business', breaking up of conglomerates, externalising 'non-strategic' activities, and share buy backs as a means of increasing shareholder value (Morin, 1998, 21-48; 2000: 48-9 ).
These, in combination with acquiring core business (notably research and development) overseas, were seen as the best means to raise the market capitalisation of the firms in which they had recently acquired stakes (Goyer 2003b foreign investors that French firms were responsive to shareholder concerns (Morin 1998; 2000: 38-42) . This M & A activity focused on international concentration on core strategic activity, and differs from earlier noyau dur reinforcing strategies. This is particularly true of firms where US pension funds invested heavily, suggesting that the shareholder value dominant strategic paradigm is an important driver behind the contemporary restructuring (Kechidi 2003: tables 4 & 5) .
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French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy AXA-UAP's shareholding links with many key players across the various hard cores in the mid-to-late 1990s could have given AXA a pivotal role in orchestrating the financial nexus of France's political economy, yet it chose to relinquish significant stakes in a range of major firms, including Crédit National, Schneider and Suez, and retained only those holdings it saw as essential to its core business. Such moves from the protective logic of unrelated cross-shareholdings within France's 'financial network economy' (Morin 2000: 37) , and towards Anglo-Saxon shareholder value norms began a trend since emulated by other significant players within the noyaux durs, notably with the Allianz-AGF buy-out in 1997 (Morin 1998 (Morin , 2000 Goyer 2003; O'Sullivan, 2003) . The degree of erosion of noyaux durs is considerable but not complete. 
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors -Trojan horses or sleeping partners?
The proportion of foreign equity holdings on the Paris bourse has acquired totemic status within the French political economy debate as indicating a paradigm shift. The power of UK/US institutional investors to transform 'domestic' corporate governance practises is widely accepted (Morin 1998; , and some see US institutional investors as Trojan horses of Anglo-Saxon capitalism (Desportes & Mauduit 1999) . The degree of change needs to be carefully gauged across different aspects of corporate governance. The causal mechanisms by which the Anglo-Saxon influx brings about transformation needs to be specified, and the implications of these changes for the French model of capitalism need to be set out with precision.
Whilst it is straightforward to establish the shareholder-value oriented preferences of These included creating the French futures market, the Second Marché of unlisted securities, and decompartmentalising and freeing up securities, futures and foreign exchange markets (Loriaux 1991: 214-225; Cerny 1989: 178-83) . These reforms involved a substantial extension of the regulatory oversight powers of the COB. The COB has recently been further empowered through the NRE (Aglietta & Rebérioux 2005: 61) , and its role in ensuring transparency of information passed to shareholders has expanded.
Furthermore, the COB has increased the transparency requirements it must itself meet (Tiberghien 2004: 19-20) .
In addition to empowerment of state actors in the re-regulation of French financial markets, there has also been a partial judicialisation of French corporate governance. This trend has seen judges, rather than state actors, empowered in certain important respects.
The resultant complex amalgam involves increased judicial activism co-existing with state activism, some of it novel, some more familiar. The key point here is that the mechanism of change, French company law, pushes evolution in a peculiar direction.
Elements of the NRE are consistent with the Anglo-Saxon evolution in French financial market regulation, especially the way the role of law is conceived. Another important corollary of the intérêt social of the company is that it incorporates a wider range of actors than only shareholders or managers. Here Prime Minister Jospin
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French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy had laid out in 1999 his desire to improve the consultation and information procedures with regard to salaried employees (Jospin 1999) , and these were realised in the NRE.
This highlights counter-tendencies within the NRE, and tells against interpreting the episode as convergence on Anglo-Saxon norms. In terms of stakeholder 'versus'
shareholder conceptions of and approaches to corporate governance, the NRE is conspicuously 'stakeholder' oriented. The company in France is seen as something other The conception of workers' interests underpinning this stakeholder approach construes them as analogous to shareholders' interests (see Jospin 1999) . This is a paradoxical shift, given potentially antagonistic interests of shareholders and workers (Frison-Roche 2002: 86), which NRE provisions relating to layoffs and plans sociaux (redundancy plans) are likely to bring to the fore. In the French case, the discordant nature of shareholder and worker interests is reinforced by the fact that workers lack sufficient power within the firm to exploit any greater transparency and disclosure to their advantage. This reduces the likelihood of a pro-transparency shareholder-worker coalition similar to that detected in Germany (Jackson Hoepner & Kurdelbusch 2005: 112-114) . Furthermore, intérêt social, whilst preventing exclusively shareholder-oriented strategies, has not been deployed to enhance the status of workers within firms. Therefore there is little prospect of the worker empowerment (Goyer & Hancké 2005: 190-194 ).
The shareholder AGMs, which worker representatives have a right to attend, are not the sites of the crucial decisions, for example, relating to redundancy plans, restructuring or wage policies. These decisions take place amongst senior management, where workers have no rights of access. Even where they do have a say, the best workers representatives can realistically hope to achieve is a delaying of the decision process ( Thus the attempt to specify a role for a wider range of stakeholders within the NRE does not necessarily translate into their empowerment.
Overall, labour has not been empowered within French corporate governance, but given the ideologically fragmented and confrontational history of French industrial relations (Milner 1995: 229) , this is best interpreted as persistence, rather than convergence.
Organised labour's limited power and influence in the contemporary French model is not 'brought about' by globalisation, rather, the latter constitutes a new context within which the enduring weakness of French labour manifests itself.
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The UK influenced 'good' corporate governance agenda (OECD 1999; In the important area of transparency, the NRE substantially bolstered disclosure requirements for remuneration of all executive office holders (Art. 116), challenging the historic opacity of French corporate governance in general, and executive remuneration in particular. 6 Although there remains some ambiguity as to what counts as 'remuneration' (Magnier 2002: 73) , this increased disclosure is politically significant, given public disquiet at the introduction of 'stock options' during the controversial restructuring of the French food producing multi-national Danone in 2001. The rationale behind the layoffs was not a lack of profitability of the plant, but rather that financial market performance had not been sufficiently good to deliver stock option bonuses for executives (Mottis and Ponssard 2002: 140) . This was widely interpreted as a dangerous portent of American-style capitalisme sauvage arriving on French soil.
However, despite NRE reforms, questions remain surrounding the transparency, the level, and the nature of executive remuneration (Jeffers & Magnier 2002: 61-3) . This, combined with the uneven distribution of new transparency-oriented corporate governance institutions and processes (Goyer 2003a: 6; O'Sullivan 2003: 41) , indicate the problems of extrapolating from this dramatic example. The ability of these executive incentivising oriented changes to transform corporate behaviour may be more limited than the case of Danone suggests. There remains widespread resistance amongst some of France's largest
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French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy firms to the push towards transparency and accountability (Goyer 2003b 194-7; O'Sullivan 2003: 58) . Furthermore, the public outcry at the Danone saga demonstrated that the shareholder value paradigm has not taken root within French society, and popular capitalism is still not that popular (O'Sullivan 2003: 42; Hancké 2002 51-5) .
Thus overall the NRE increases transparency requirements, and seeks to limit to management autonomy. Yet it also diversifies the sets of interests that executives must take into account along stakeholder lines. The NRE conceives of the role of law in a distinctly 'Anglo-Saxon' manner. Yet the content of French company law, and the enduring central importance of the concept of intérêt social of the company, indicates ongoing divergence from the 'shareholder value' paradigm. Crouch's 'recombinant institutions' approach helps explain this complex configuration, with elements of more than one model co-existing within 'empirical incongruences ' (2005: 453) . This example is further testament to the process of hybridisation within the French model, a more modest, but a more defensible claim than assertions of convergence.
Mechanism 3: The Market for Corporate Control
Perhaps the most important mechanism by which the increased significance of capital markets for corporate funding is supposed in theory to change the behaviour and operations of firms is through the market for corporate control. Hitherto, the noyaux durs had been the crux of French 'protected capitalism', and the placing of controlling stakes in 'safe' hands provided an effective barrier to hostile takeovers. As noted above -these (Culpepper 2005, 193) , and only 19 hostile takeovers took place between 1991 and 2000 (Montagne, Pernot & Sauviat, 2002) , illustrating that the French market for corporate control remains underdeveloped.
Thus, despite the demise of the noyaux durs, obstacles remain in the path of Anglo-Saxon market discipline. Some long-established characteristics of French corporate capitalism, including the enduring concentration of ownership and the internal constitutions of companies, continue to insulate management. One mechanism through which 'insiders' are empowered at the expense of 'outsiders' is differential shareholder voting rights.
Much importance is attached to the 'one share, one vote, one dividend' principle within Anglo-Saxon influenced calls for 'good' corporate governance (OECD 1999; ).
Once again we should note a disparity between the theory and practice of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. In reality, the US model in particular represents an 'impure' form of the Anglo-Saxon ideal type, with unequal voting rights a prevalent feature of its corporate governance arrangements (Monks & Minow 2004: 122-126) , part of management's hidden protectionist arsenal (Charkham 2005: 263-6, 276-286 
Conclusions
At a glance from the global level, the changes in French financial market operations and regulation suggest evidence of convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon liberal market economy. However, when attention is focused on the mechanisms of change within models of capitalism, as here, the need to admit the notion of diversity in the explanation and characterisation asserts itself forcefully in seeking to understand how capitalism works in particular settings.
The central contention of this article is that the reason why the global convergence thesis misrepresents contemporary evolutions can be sought in insufficient attention being paid to mechanisms of change within models of capitalism. Secondly, this analysis has demonstrated how a 'recombinant capitalism' approach (Crouch 2005) , framing its analysis in terms of hybridisation and fragmentation of national models, offers greater explanatory purchase over the French model, does less violence to the facts, and as such offers a promising way out of the 'convergence or persistence' impasse. 
